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Abstract
Banks are expected to operate within acceptable standards of governance for 
consistent profitable operations. They run heavily on customer deposits, which 
is confidence-driven. Since the quality of governance is critical to winning and 
retaining customer confidence and patronage, the imperative for good governance 
practices in banks cannot be overemphasized. This research paper explores the 
nexus between governance practices and bank profitability in Nigeria. It adopts the 
size of bank board and directors’ stake as proxies for corporate governance, with 
return on assets and return on equity as representations for financial performance. 
The research incorporates firm size as a controlled variable. The estimation tech-
nique of the Generalized Method of Moments was employed. Evidence from the 
research reveals that board size, directors’ equity, and firm size substantially affect 
Nigerian banks’ financial performance. Besides, the study shows a robust effect of 
lagged return on equity on the current level of performance. Therefore, the study 
asserts that governance in business entities strongly affects their financial perfor-
mance and recommends maintaining optimum board size to minimize boardroom 
conflicts. It further prescribes that the requirement for substantial equity stake by 
directors of banking institutions be sustained, as it secures commitment to gover-
nance practices that support profitability.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is the performance of the task of admin-
istration in corporate entities to enhance shareholder value with-
out jeopardizing other interest groups’ legitimate expectations, 
thereby promoting firm sustainability. The underlying principle 
is to resolve the agency dilemma prevalent in many organizations 
(Oyarzún, 2011). It is designed to check corporate abuse arising 
from conflict of interest whereby management, acting as the agent, 
deploys the organization’s resources to advance own interests rath-
er than of the stockholders (principals). The concept of governance 
in business organizations is neither new to the world of business 
nor is it new to economic literature but has attracted greater at-
tention since the early 1990s due to the increasing wave of globali-
zation, requirements for increased financial reporting, and rising 
episodes of corporate failures. For instance, Lahart (2009), Zandi 
(2009), and Faber (2009) attribute recent emphasis on the subject to 
series of financial scandals, which caused the collapse of corporate 
giants around the world early in the millennium. 
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Poor corporate governance practice is a cankerworm that affects organizations and has led to the col-
lapse of private and public entities across economic sectors, thereby impairing overall economic per-
formance. It manifests in the sub-optimal deployment of organizations’ resources with adverse macro-
economic implications. For instance, despite the successful recapitalization of Nigerian banks1 in 2006, 
Sanusi (2009) avers that poor governance led to systemic capital inadequacy and illiquidity just within 
three years of the reform, which prompted the take-over of eight banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and subsequent injection of six hundred and twenty (620) billion naira bailout fund in the dis-
tressed banks. Of eight banks, only Bank PHB (now Keystone Bank) and Union Bank survived, indicat-
ing that mismanagement diverts resources away from productive uses. 
Good and adequate corporate governance mechanisms support the going concern principle of business 
and are critical elements of sustainable growth and development. Business stakeholders like creditors, 
host communities, suppliers, shareholders, employees, consumers, and the government are happy when 
businesses are profitably managed because their interests are well catered for when firms generate suf-
ficient cash flows. For instance, the government receives steady revenue in the form of corporate tax, 
which is required for infrastructural development, and through improved tax revenue, corporate gov-
ernance can enhance capital formation (Okoye, Evbuomwan, Achugamonu, & Araghan, 2016). For the 
banking sector, Okafor (2011) argues that good corporate governance validates management integrity 
and defines the quality of financial services offered by banks, thereby influencing the sector’s overall 
performance. Besides, sound corporate governance practices stabilize and strengthen financial markets, 
protect investors, promote firm performance, and attract investments (Cheema & Din, 2013).
Before introducing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) corporate governance code in 2003 in 
Nigeria, poor governance practices led to incessant episodes of distress due to declining profitability and 
erosion of public confidence in banking operations. Banks gave out loans without adequate collateral or no 
collateral (in some cases), directors gave loans to themselves (Akpan & Riman, 2012), and staff colluded with 
outsiders to defraud banks, leading to massive non-performing loans. Though the code was not directed sole-
ly at the banking sector, it was designed to check corporate abuses and support sustainable business practices. 
Apart from the 2003 landmark corporate governance code, the regulators have introduced some other 
corporate governance guidelines overtime to regulate Nigeria’s financial system. Among them is the 
corporate governance code for banks (2006) designed by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to check 
observed weaknesses in governance practices adopted by banks in the post-consolidation period2. There 
are also the revised CBN prudential guidelines for licensed banks (2010), which contained specific pro-
visions aimed at reinforcing and/or complementing the 2006 corporate governance code3. Other extant 
codes on corporate governance include the PENCOM code of 2008 for pension fund administrators, 
the NAICOM code (2009) for insurance companies, the Central Bank of Nigeria code (2014), and the 
National Corporate Governance Code 2016 issued by the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria.
However, despite the listed corporate governance mechanisms and associated sanctions for non-com-
pliance, there are still episodes of bank failures. For example, of 25 banks that emerged from the bank-
ing consolidation, no less than five banks have ceased to exist due to corporate governance infractions, 
lending credence to a 2003 survey by SEC, which produced evidence of the significant contribution of 
poor governance to most reported episodes of bank distress in Nigeria (CBN, 2006). 
Though there is ample evidence in the literature that improved governance practices enhance financial per-
formance, not many studies from Sub-Saharan African countries have considered how directors’ sharehold-
1 Bank capital was raised from 2 billion naira to 25 billion naira between July 2004 and December 2005 to deepen banks’ role in the Nigerian 
economy (Soludo, 2004). Only 25 out of 89 banks emerged from the reform. 
2 The 2006 code separated the position of Chief Executive from the office of Board Chairman. 
3 The revised CBN prudential guideline (2010) provided for tenure limitation for bank CEOs.
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ing and firm size affect profitability. For instance, if business executives do not have a substantial stake, their 
commitment to successful outcomes may not be guaranteed. In addition, it can be argued that rapid growth 
in size may create governance challenges arising from a lack of managerial capacity and discipline. Based on 
the Generalized Method of Moments, this research estimates how the return on assets and return on equity 
(profitability ratios) respond to board size and directors’ stake in the business. The study introduced a firm 
size as a controlled variable. The study covers the period 2003–2016.
1. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK: 
STEWARDSHIP THEORY  
OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
Scholars have developed several theories to explain, 
evaluate, or predict the relationship between gov-
ernance and organizational performance. They in-
clude social contract, legitimacy, political, agency, 
resource dependency, stakeholder, and steward-
ship theories. However, the connection between 
governance and profitability in business entities 
is discussed in this research within the steward-
ship theory context. The theory adopts sociolog-
ical and psychological approaches to governance.
As opposed to the opportunistic, individualistic, 
and self-serving assumption of agency theory, stew-
ardship theory projects managers as collectivists, 
pro-organizational, and trustworthy. The theory 
depicts managers as stewards who protect and max-
imize shareholder value through firm performance 
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). The theo-
ry posits that managers find fulfillment from their 
organizations’ success and place the interest of their 
principals above their own interests. It is, therefore, 
an organization-centered theory of management. 
It aims at creating value for shareholders through 
sustained improvements in business performance. 
Under the stewardship theory, the positions of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Board Chairman are 
invested in one executive, with a board comprised 
mostly of in-house members to allow for intimate 
knowledge of organizational operations and deep 
commitment to success. This is premised on the 
assumption that having a single leader creates one 
channel to communicate business needs to the 
shareholders and the shareholders’ needs to the 
business, thereby minimizing episodes of confusion 
and conflict of interest. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The imperative for sound corporate governance 
was, at early stages, underscored by the need to 
safeguard shareholders’ interest, but over time, the 
scope was extended to include protection of other 
important interests in business organizations (Jizi, 
Salama, Dixon, & Startling, 2014). The shift to 
stakeholder emphasis derives from the argument 
that these other interests are equally threatened 
when business organizations are poorly managed. 
The significance of sound governance practices to 
business performance is well established in the lit-
erature. For instance, Kolk and Pinske (2010) posit 
that strong corporate governance structures boost 
stakeholder confidence, strongly indicating man-
agement commitment to the efficient and respon-
sible management of business organizations. Good 
corporate governance also minimizes exposure to 
risk for investors and promotes firm performance 
(Spanos, 2005). Studies by Bae and Goyal (2010), 
Monda and Georgino (2013), P. Dua and S. Dua 
(2015), I. Yang, Yan, Li, and H. Yang (2012), and 
Botosan (2006) show that enhanced stock per-
formance correlates strongly with improvements 
in corporate governance practices. Ojeka, Iyoha, 
Ikpefan, and Osakwe (2017) estimated the rela-
tionship between governance and stock market 
behavior in Nigeria and discover the robust posi-
tive effect of independent audit committee, finan-
cial expertise of audit committee, and board inde-
pendence on stock price, volume traded, earnings 
per share, and market capitalization. 
The work of Uwuigbe (2011) presents a negative 
correlation between bank profitability and board 
size, while directors’ interest and degree of cor-
porate disclosure correlate positively with finan-
cial performance. It further shows a marked dif-
ference between healthy banks’ performance 
and rescued banks but did not substantiate that 
the performance of banks whose boards are com-
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posed of a mix of foreign and indigenous direc-
tors differs significantly from those that do not 
have foreign directors. However, research by Bae 
and Goyal (2010) shows that foreign-owned firms 
record enhanced performance. Boussaada and 
Karmani (2015) also observed that the proportion 
of independent directors, institutional sharehold-
ers, and foreign investors on bank boards have a 
robust positive effect on ROA and ROE. However, 
they present a significant negative impact of board 
size on both measures of performance. Besides, 
while CEO duality indicates a strong positive ef-
fect on ROA, it shows a non-significant effect on 
ROE. There is no evidence that bank size strongly 
impacts the performance of the banks. However, 
Choi and Hasan (2005) find no substantial impact 
of foreign directors on Korean banks’ profitability. 
Also, the work of Kumar (2004) did not establish a 
significant impact of foreign shareholding on the 
financial performance of Indian firms.
Akinyomi and Olutoye (2015) studied how the 
proportion of non-executive to executive direc-
tors affects bank profitability and observed that 
profitability is not significantly affected by how 
bank boards are composed. Besides, they find that 
board size and directors’ equity did not correlate 
significantly with bank profitability. Conversely, 
Filip, Vesna, and Kiril (2014) find a strong nega-
tive effect of board independence on ROA and 
ROE. However, board size displays a strong pos-
itive correlation with ROA but a non-significant 
relationship with ROE. They further observe a 
strong positive association between the tenure of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and performance. 
Research by Adigwe, Nwanna, and John (2016) 
showed that the audit committee and directors’ in-
terest enhance profitability, while the bank board’s 
composition does not substantially affect it. 
Patibandla (2006) also reveals increased profitabil-
ity and foreign investment due to improvements in 
governance practices among Indian firms. Further 
validation of the performance-enhancing impact 
of governance on firm performance is captured in 
Yauri, Muhammad, and Kaoje (2013) who reveal 
that Chief Executive Officer’s tenure, frequency 
of board meeting, and risk management correlate 
positively with performance in the Nigerian bank-
ing sector. The Colombian study by Orozco and 
Vargas (2018) reports a substantial positive associ-
ation between board size and business reputation 
but shows that board size correlates negatively 
with financial performance. However, studies by 
Belkhir (2009) and Ene and Bello (2016) discover 
the significant positive effect of board size on bank 
performance. Besides, Ene and Bello (2016) report 
that the number of non-executive directors posi-
tively correlates with financial performance.
Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for performance, 
Klapper and Love (2002), Lefort and Urzúa (2008), 
and Kutubi (2011) provide empirical support per-
formance-enhancing capacity of good corporate 
governance. Besides, they show that for countries 
that offer weak protection to investors, corporate 
governance is critical for improved performance. 
Lefort and Urzúa (2008) also present a strong pos-
itive association between board size and firm per-
formance (proxied as Tobin’s Q) for Chilean firms. 
Kutubi (2011) investigated the influence of the 
corporate board’s size and independence on bank 
performance in Bangladesh and observed that re-
turns on both equity and assets of banks depend 
feebly on governance. However, with Tobin’s Q as 
a proxy for performance, the study reveals a ro-
bust positive effect of governance on profitability.
Eluyela, Akintimehin, Okere, Ozordi, Osuma, 
Ilogho, and Oladipo (2018) also examined how 
profitability responds to board meetings and ob-
serve that more frequent board meetings corre-
late positively with firm performance (proxied as 
Tobin’s Q). The authors also report a non-robust 
positive relationship between firm performance 
and board size. Further evidence from the study 
reveals a strong positive correlation between firm 
size and performance. The Saudi-based study of 
Fallatah and Dickins (2012) did not show a signif-
icant correlation between corporate governance 
and profitability with return on assets as a proxy 
but reports significant positive relationship when 
Tobin’s Q and market value of equity was adopt-
ed as proxies for performance, which suggests that 
the interaction between performance and govern-
ance may depend on the proxy used.
Adeusi, Akeke, Aribaba, and Adebisi (2013) ob-
serve the non-significant impact of the bank 
board’s size and composition on performance. 
They further show an adverse effect of external 
board members on bank profitability. On the other 
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hand, Olayiwola (2018) observes that large board 
retards profitability, while its composition facili-
tates financial performance but did not establish 
a robust connection between the size of the audit 
committee and profitability. In their study, John 
and Ibenta (2016) reported that the bank board’s 
size and composition adversely affect the finan-
cial health of banks. They also observe that direc-
tors’ equity correlates positively with profitability. 
Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2007) also 
report that large bank board retards performance, 
while board composition enhances it. The work 
of Raihan and Hoque (2013) not only validated a 
strong negative correlation between profitability 
and governance but also showed that bank age has 
a strong negative impact on its performance.
Research conducted by Narwal and Jindal (2015) 
on the nexus between profitability and corporate 
governance in India reveals a strong correlation 
between profitability and membership of audit 
committee, with a weak relationship between prof-
itability and number of board members, regu-
larity of board meetings, and number of external 
board members. Using least square dummy vari-
able (LSDV) panel data regression and the 2-stage 
least square estimation techniques, Surya (2016) 
reveals that independence of corporate board, 
board committee, and directors’ remuneration 
correlate positively with firm performance, while 
board size, ownership structure, and financial lev-
erage negatively affect firm performance in India. 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a) used a 
mix of listed and non-listed banks to study the 
effect of board characteristics on bank profita-
bility in Ghana and observe that the bank board 
size correlates positively with bank performance 
regardless of listing status. They also show that 
board independence correlates positively with 
bank performance despite listing status. Further 
evidence from the study reveals that CEO dual-
ity significantly enhances bank performance for 
the entire sample, but when the sample is disag-
gregated into listed and non-listed banks, CEO 
duality impedes performance. In another study, 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) exam-
ined how corporate governance affects financing 
decisions based on data generated from 47 quoted 
companies in Kenya and discover a robust posi-
tive association between debt financing and board 
size. In contrast, board independence has a signif-
icant negative relationship with short-term debts. 
They further report a negative correlation between 
CEO duality and debt financing. 
Okoye, Erin, Ahmed, and Areghan (2017) studied 
how corporate governance mechanisms affect mi-
crofinance institutions’ (MFIs) financial sustaina-
bility in Nigeria and observe that gender diversity 
and independence of bank board do not signifi-
cantly affect financial sustainability. However, the 
study also reveals that large boards promote finan-
cial sustainability. Other investigations that show 
non-substantial relevance of gender diversity to 
firm performance include Van Ness, Miesing, and 
Kang (2010), Sanan (2016), and Gallego-Alvarez, 
Garcia-Sanchez, and Rodriguez-Dominguez 
(2010). However, researches by Ongore, Peter, 
Ogutu, and Bosire (2015), Julizaerma and Sori 
(2012), and Kilic and Kuzey (2016) report sub-
stantial positive transmission of impact from 
gender diversity to financial performance. Green 
and Homroy (2018) also validate the existence of 
a positive relationship between business financial 
performance and gender diversity (female mem-
bership of board committees). Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins, and Simpson (2007) specifically observe 
that female board members positively affect firm 
performance by participating in audit commit-
tees. However, Jadah, Murugiah, and Adzis (2016) 
showed a strong negative association between fe-
male membership of boards and firm performance 
for Iraqi-listed banks. It also presents strong em-
pirical support for the performance-enhancing 
feature of board composition. 
Research by Mutuku (2016) on Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) financial perfor-
mance in Machakos and Anthi river sub-countries 
reports that board composition, leadership of cor-
porate board, and level of disclosure positively affect 
financial performance. However, gender did not 
substantially account for profitability. The study fur-
ther shows that academic qualification and occupa-
tion contribute to the board’s capacity to drive per-
formance. The work of Barus, Muturi, Kibati, and 
Koima (2017), which focused on how the efficiency 
of management affects the financial performance of 
Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) 
in Kenya, shows that performance is not strongly af-
fected by the efficiency of management. 
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Harun (2017) explored how Ethiopian private 
banks’ financial performance responds to extant 
corporate governance requirements and observes 
that performance does not respond considerably to 
board gender diversity and liquidity ratio, but that 
educational attainment of board members great-
ly determines performance level in the banks. The 
research further reveals that number of sub-com-
mittees, regularity of board meetings, and firm 
ownership do not substantially affect the selected 
banks’ performance. Arumona, Erin, Onmonya, 
and Omotayo (2019) provide strong support for 
financial education’s performance-enhancing ca-
pacity. Prior work by Agrawal and Chadha (2005) 
provides robust evidence that boards that have 
independent directors with expertise in financial 
education profit from valuable oversight of their 
financial reporting practices. Though the ear-
ly research conducted by Milliken and Martins 
(1996) also emphasized the relevance of education 
to group effectiveness, they further observe that 
problem-solving groups with heterogeneous or 
diverse educational backgrounds have a stronger 
impact on performance. 
From a study of selected Vietnamese firms, Vo 
and Phan (2013) observe that female membership 
of corporate boards, CEO duality, board members’ 
experience, and directors’ compensation positive-
ly impact return on assets, but performance di-
minishes with an increase in board size. Another 
Vietnamese study by Le and Thi (2016) reports 
that board size, chairman ownership, and concen-
trated ownership promote profitability (proxied 
as Tobin’s Q), while leverage negatively correlates 
with firm performance. However, CEO duality 
and CEO ownership did not show a significant re-
lationship with firm performance. 
Using the data from five quoted banks in Nigeria 
for 2007–2014, Olokoyo, Adegboye, Okoye, 
Evbuomwan, and Adebo (2019) analyzed how se-
lected internal corporate governance components 
affect bank performance. The result indicates sup-
port for persistence or lag effect of governance 
on firm performance. It shows a strong adverse 
effect of lagged board composition and board 
size on bank performance. Bebeji, Mohammed, 
and Tanko (2015) report a strong negative effect 
of board size on ROA and ROE and the strong 
positive effect of board composition on both per-
formance measures. Evidence from Isik and Ince 
(2016) indicates a significant positive effect of 
board size on operating return on assets (OROA) 
and return on assets (ROA). It further reveals the 
non-significant negative effect of board composi-
tion on OROA but a significant negative effect on 
ROA. 
Based on a panel study of 329 microfinance institu-
tions (MFIs) from 73 countries, Strøm, D’Espallier, 
and Mersland (2014) provide empirical support for 
a positive relationship between female CEO and 
female board chair, and the performance of MFIs 
but did not provide evidence that improved cor-
porate governance drives firm performance. The 
research by Roodposhti and Chasmi (2010) indi-
cates that business ownership and independent 
boards correlate negatively with firm earnings 
in Iran. Shivaani, Jain, and Yadav (2017) also 
showed the negative influence of board size and 
board committees on return on assets and equi-
ty. It further reports that the presence of outside 
directors and whistleblowers enhances financial 
performance.
From a study of fifty largest Chinese banks be-
tween 2003 and 2010, Liang, Xu, and Jiraporn 
(2013) discovered the frequency of board meetings 
and the number of independent directors strong-
ly enhance both quality of bank assets and bank 
performance, though board size was shown to 
correlate negatively with performance. They al-
so observe that the bank board’s political affilia-
tion negatively affects both the performance and 
asset quality of the banks. The work of Adekunle 
and Aghedo (2014), which studied financial per-
formance and corporate governance in selected 
firms in Nigeria, reveals robust positive impact 
transmission from board size and its composi-
tion to firm performance. However, the study did 
establish an inverse relationship between owner-
ship concentration and return on assets. Research 
by Usman and Yero (2012) also reveals a negative 
impact of ownership concentration on earnings 
management in listed conglomerates in Nigeria. 
A study of the Sri Lankan financial services sector 
conducted by Thuraisingam (2013) shows no sub-
stantial association between governance and firm 
performance. Tata and Sharma (2012) report that 
board structures, business ownership, and corpo-
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rate disclosures do not correlate significantly with 
Indian business organizations’ profitability. Also, 
the work of Sarpal and Singh (2013) did not estab-
lish a robust relationship between corporate board 
and performance. On the other hand, a study of 
the Jordanian insurance sub-sector carried out by 
Salim and Iskandar (2017) indicates that the num-
ber of external directors and foreign ownership 
strongly improves firm performance, while the 
separation of CEO and board chair roles retard it. 
In a study of 103 quoted firms from Ghana, Kenya, 
South Africa, and Nigeria, Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) observe that while board size, board inde-
pendence, and CEOs tenure have a strong positive 
effect on corporate profitability, consolidation of 
the position of the CEO and board chairman re-
tard performance. It also reveals that the audit 
committee’s size, frequency of audit committee 
meetings, and institutional shareholdings posi-
tively affect market performance and firm valua-
tion. The study further suggests that the interac-
tion between governance and firm profitability 
derives substantially from how variables are ap-
proximated. For instance, while board size did 
not show a strong positive correlation with ROA, 
it correlates strongly with Tobin’s Q. Also, insti-
tutional shareholding correlates negatively with 
ROA but positively with Tobin’s Q. For the fre-
quency of the audit committee meeting, while the 
association is strongly positive with Tobin’s Q, it is 
nearly independent of ROA.
Goel (2018) conducted a multi-sectoral analysis 
of the effectiveness of corporate governance prac-
tices adopted by Indian firms over two reform 
periods of 2012–2013 and 2015–2016. The study 
reveals that post-reform improvements in gov-
ernance practices significantly impact financial 
performance only in the 2012–2013 period. Sani, 
Aliyu, and Bakare (2019) estimated the impact of 
governance on financial performance in Nigerian 
banking and observed a strong positive effect of 
management shareholding on financial perfor-
mance, suggesting that management commitment 
to firm performance is closely tied to their level of 
investment in the business. 
4 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) was used to estimate the parameters of the model because it solves the problem of endogeneity 
so that group-specific time-invariant factors do not affect parameter estimates and reduces serial correlation problem to the minimum. 
Zsohar (2012) defines GMM as a semi-parametric estimation framework that allows only introducing restrictions implied in economic 
theory.
This literature review shows that though finan-
cial performance and corporate governance have 
remained very topical, empirical evidence on 
how firm performance is affected by governance 
is rather mixed, an indication that there is no 
straightjacket connection between the financial 
performance of business organizations and how 
they are governed. It shows that the interaction 
between performance and governance derives 
from the proxies used for the variables. Finally, 
it was observed that despite numerous research 
studies on corporate governance and profitabili-
ty, very few studies have focused on how directors’ 
shareholding and firm size affect profitability, and 
therein lies the novelty of this study.
3. METHODS AND 
HYPOTHESES
The study is quantitative and adopts the ex-post 
facto design. Financial statements of the select-
ed banks for the period 2003–2016 provided da-
ta for the research. Following from the objectives 
of the study, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM)4 analytical technique based on STATA 13 
statistical procedure was used to analyze the data. 
3.1. Model specification
The modified version of Miyajima, Omi, and Sato 
(2003) adopted by Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006a) to estimate the nexus between corporate 
governance and bank performance was used in 
this study. The model in Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe (2006a) is stated in its explicit form as:





measures of firm performance; G
it 
– 
vector of corporate governance proxies: bank size 





to ascertain if positions of CEO and board chair-
man are consolidated or separated, CEO tenure, 
and controlled variables: firm size and debt struc-
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The above model was modified in line with 



























 – return on assets; ROE
t
 – return on 
equity; BSIZE
t
 – board size; LTAS
t 
– log trans-
formation of total assets (proxy for firm size); 
DINT
t 







– coefficient to be estimated; µ – er-
ror term.
3.2. Operationalization  
of variables 
Board size represents the total board members. It 
includes executive and non-executive directors. 
Directors’ equity is measured as total number of 
shares held by directors divided by total number 
of shares issued.
Return on equity is measured as profit after tax or 
net profit divided by shareholders’ equity.
Return on assets is measured as profit after tax or 
net profit divided by total assets.
Firm size represents total assets of each bank.
3.3. Research hypotheses
The null form of the hypotheses formulated for 
this study is stated as follows:
H
0
1: Corporate governance does not have a signif-
icant effect on return on assets (ROA).
H
0
2: Return on equity (ROE) is not significantly 
affected by corporate governance practices.
The models specified in equations (2) and (3) are 
used to test these hypotheses.
4. RESULTS 
Estimates from the econometric test are presented 
and discussed in this section. The data’s statistical 
properties were analyzed to show its basic descrip-
tive parameters, while correlation among the var-
iables was examined to reveal how they interact 
with one another.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of the data are presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 observed that for eight selected banks, av-
erage ROE was about 11.6 percent, while the series 
deviates from the mean by 19.8 percent. This im-
plies that ROE can vary from its mean by about 
19.8 percent. The maximum and minimum values 
of ROE generated over the study period are –86 
percent and 89 percent, respectively. For return on 
assets (ROA), a mean of 2.1 percent was observed 
with a standard deviation of 7 percent. The mini-
mum and maximum values of ROA are –53 per-
cent and 32 percent, respectively.
For board size, about 13 was observed, with a 
standard deviation of about 3. The banks have 
minimum and maximum board sizes of 6 and 19, 
respectively. Directors’ equity or interest stood at 
about 26.7 percent of total shareholdings in the 
banks, with a standard deviation of about 19.2 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables
Source: Author’s computation from published accounts of the studied banks using STATA.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ROA 112 0.020932 0.072829 –0.53125 0.3241
ROE 112 0.116464 0.197927 –0.86844 0.89654
BSIZE 112 12.94643 2.884689 6 19
DINT 112 0.266974 0.192371 0.0342 0.851
LTAS 112 9.480061 0.285563 9.018478 9.999191
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percent. Minimum and maximum shareholdings 
by directors stood at 3.4 percent and 85 percent of 
total issued shares. The average total assets held by 
the banks were 9.48, with a standard deviation of 
about 0.286. The minimum and maximum values 
stood at 9.02 and 10.00, respectively. 
4.2. Correlation matrix
The matrix in Table 2 shows how the variables in 
the model interact with one another. However, for 
this study, the emphasis is on the relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and the independ-
ent variables. The diagonal of the matrix is a set 
of 1 because the correlation between a variable 
and itself is always 1. In other words, a correlation 
matrix is symmetrical. The correlation coefficient 
ranges between –1 and 1.
Table 2. Correlation matrix for the variables
Source: Author’s computation from annual reports of studied banks using 
STATA.
Variable ROA ROE BIZE DINT LTAS
ROA 1 – – – –
ROE 0.2466 1 – – –
BSIZE 0.2457 –0.0598 1 – –
DINT –0.0943 0.0072 –0.0813 1 –
LTAS 0.0304 –0.2262 0.1202 0.1582 1
The correlation matrix presented in Table 2 shows 
a weak positive association between ROA and 
BSIZE, with a correlation coefficient of 0.2457. It 
also shows a more feeble negative relationship be-
tween ROA and DINT, with correlation coefficient 
approximating –0.1. Furthermore, with a coeffi-
cient of 0.0304, the matrix shows a weak positive 
relationship between ROA and TAS.
The correlation test presents an inverse connec-
tion between ROE and BSIZE, with a coefficient of 
–0.0598. A very weak positive relationship between 
ROE and DINT was also observed, with a coeffi-
cient of 0.0072. Finally, the result shows a weak 
negative association between ROE and TAS, with 
a coefficient of –0.2262.
From the correlation matrix, the relationship 
among the independent variables does not suggest 
multi-collinearity, which indicates that the data 
can further be processed for policy decisions. This 
is indicated by the reasonably moderate values of 
the associated coefficients.
4.3. Regression analysis  
(Generalized Method of Moments)
The regression estimates based on the Generalized 
Method of Moments are presented in Tables 3 
and 4.
Model 1: Dependent variable (ROA): system dy-
namic panel-data estimation
Model 2: Dependent variable (ROE): system dy-
namic panel-data estimation
Table 3. Regression estimates for return on assets (ROA)
Source: Author’s computation from annual reports of studied banks using STATA.
ROA Coef. Std. err Z p > |Z| [95% conf. interval]
ROA – – – – Lower limit Upper limit
ROA (–1) 0.0263495 0.0838265 0.31 0.7530 –0.1379473 0.1906464
BSIZE –0.0107527 0.0029008 0.761 0.3450 0.0050672 0.0164382
DINT 0.0479112 0.0459867 3.04 0.0297 0.1380435 0.0422211
LTAS 0.0610397 0.0297461 2.05 0.0400 0.0027384 0.1193409
CONST. –0.6865451 0.2779649 –2.47 0.0140 –1.231346 –0.141744
Wald chi2 (4) = 25.15 Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 4. Regression estimates for return on equity (ROE)
Source: Author’s computation from annual reports of studied banks using STATA.
ROE Coeff. Std. err Z p > |Z| [95% conf. interval]
ROE – – – Lower limit Upper limit
ROE (–1) 0.3286716 0.0821818 4.0 0.0000 0.1675982 0.4897449
BSIZE –0.0048106 0.006885 –0.7 0.4850 –0.018305 0.0086838
DINT 0.0511786 0.1052611 2.31 0.0627 0.1551295 0.2574866
LTAS 0.0666501 0.0709301 2.94 0.0347 –0.0205671 0.0723703
CONST. 0.7537662 0 .6597117 1.14 0.253 –0.5392449 2.046777
Wald chi2 (4) = 19.25 Prob. > chi2 = 0.0007
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5. DISCUSSION
The regression analysis result using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) pre-
sented in Table 3 evaluates the effect of the in-
dependent variables on corporate governance. 
From the estimates, lagged ROA (lag 1) did not 
significantly affect the current ROA. This indi-
cates that its own past developments or trends 
do not strongly determine the current behavior 
of return on assets.
The beta coefficient for BSIZE shows a neg-
ative value of –0.0107527, which suggests a 1 
percent addition to board size will cause a 0.01 
percent decrease in ROA. The negative result 
indicates that an increase in board size can 
be counter-productive, implying that as more 
shareholders get elected to bank boards, con-
f lict of interests may arise, leading to board-
room squabbles and other negative practices 
that impede the efficiency of operations. This 
result, though not significant (p-value > 0.05), 
is consistent with the findings of Fallatah and 
Dickens (2007), Kyereboah-Coleman (2007b), 
Kutubi (2011), Uwuigbe (2011), Orozco and 
Vargas (2018), but counters the outcomes in 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a), Filip, 
Vesna, and Kiril (2014), Adekunle and Aghedo 
(2014), Ene and Bello (2016), and Isik and Ince 
(2016) who present the strong positive effect of 
governance on performance. It is also not con-
sistent with the findings of Vo and Phan (2013), 
Bebeji, Mohammed, and Tanko (2015), Raihan 
and Hoque (2013), Liang, Xu, and Jiraporn 
(2013), Boussaada and Karmani (2015), Shivaani, 
Jain, and Yadav (2017), and Olokoyo, Adegboye, 
Okoye, Evbuomwan, and Adebo (2019) who 
show a strong negative effect of corporate gov-
ernance on bank performance.  
The result further shows significant positive ef-
fect DINT on ROA at a 5 percent level of sig-
nificance, with a coefficient of 0.0479. This 
suggests that a unit increase in directors’ eq-
uity or interest will increase firm performance 
by 0.0479 units. The result for directors’ equi-
ty implies that directors get more committed 
to ensuring that organizations are profitably 
managed when they stand to lose more should 
the organizations fail. This validates the find-
ings of Uwuigbe (2011), Adigwe, Nwanna, and 
John (2016), and Sani Aliyu, and Bakare (2019). 
However, there is no contrary evidence from the 
reviewed literature.
The result indicates that ROA will rise by 0.06 
percent for total assets if bank assets are in-
creased by 1 percent. This relationship is sig-
nificant at 5 percent. The positive relationship 
implies that as bank assets increase, more funds 
are available for direct investments and funding 
private and public sector activities, thereby fur-
ther enhancing the earning capacity of bank as-
sets. This result aligns with Isik and Ince (2014), 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a), Vo 
and Phan (2013), but counters the non-signifi-
cant effect reported in Boussaada and Karmani 
(2015). 
The Wald chi2 accounts for the general signifi-
cance of the model. With p-value < 0.05, it shows 
that the independent variables significantly ex-
plain the phenomenon under investigation.
Based on the above results, the null hypothesis 
that corporate governance does not significant-
ly affect the return on assets (ROA) is rejected. 
Concerning the interaction between return on 
equity and dimensions of corporate governance 
examined in this research, Table 4 shows that 
lagged ROE (lag 1) strongly enhances current 
ROE. The lag effect of ROE on its current per-
formance indicates that its own previous inno-
vations significantly inf luence the current be-
havior of return on equity. The coefficient for 
BSIZE (β
1
) shows a negative value of –0.0048106, 
indicating that a unit increase in board size 
leads to a decrease in bank profitability (prox-
ied as return on equity) by 0.005 units. This 
result implies that large boards inhibit perfor-
mance and, therefore, counters the argument 
that large boards offer high-quality decisions 
when drawing from more directors’ experience. 
However, since the probability of the Z-statistic 
(0.485) is greater than 5 percent (p-value > 0.05), 
this observation is not significant. Though this 
result affirms the outcomes in Uwuigbe (2011), 
Thuraisingam (2013), Akinyomi and Olutoye 
(2015), and Filip, Vesna, and Kiril (2014), it is 
not in agreement with Pathan, Skully, and 
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Wickramanayake (2007), Ajala, Amuda, and 
Arulogun (2012), Ayorinde, Toyin, and Leye 
(2012), Liang, Xu, and Jiraporn (2013), John and 
Ibenta (2016), Bebeji, Mohammed, and Tanko 
(2015), Boussaada and Karmani (2015), Filip, 
Vesna, and Kiril (2015), and Shivaani, Jain, and 
Yadav (2017) who show that large boards strong-
ly reduce bank profitability. 
For DINT, the coefficient β
2
 of 0.0511786 indi-
cates a positive effect of directors’ interest on 
ROE. Specifically, it shows that as directors’ in-
terest is increased by1 percent, ROE is expect-
ed to increase by 0.05 per+cent. With a p-value 
of 0.0627, this result is significant at 10 percent. 
This result aligns with Uwuigbe (2011) and John 
and Ibenta (2016) but contradicts the finding of 
Akinyomi and Olutoye (2015) that directors’ eq-
uity does not significantly affect performance. 
The result for TAS also shows a strong positive 
effect of total bank assets on ROE, thereby fur-
ther validating the result that an increase in 
bank assets leads to an increase in banks’ prof-
itability. From the result, an increase of 1 per-
cent in bank assets generates about 0.067 per-
cent in ROE. The positive effect of bank assets 
on return on equity supports Boussaada and 
Karmani (2015).
The Wald chi2 indicates that the selected el-
ements of corporate governance strongly ex-
plain bank profitability. With prob. (Wald chi2) 
< 0.05, the model is considered fit for policy 
formulation. 
From the above result, the null hypothesis that 
corporate governance does not significantly af-
fect the return on equity (ROE) is rejected.
CONCLUSION 
The study shows that the current behavior of ROA is not dependent on its own past innovations. However, 
the current level of ROE significantly derives from its previous developments or trends. It also shows 
that a large bank board is an obstacle to performance. The negative impact of board size on both ROA 
and ROE (proxies for corporate governance) aligns with the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), which states that small boards can improve the financial performance of organizations because 
they are less prone to operational inefficiency, problems of moral hazard, nonchalance/lack of com-
mitment, and overbearing influence of Chief Executive Officers that characterize large-sized boards. 
However, it contradicts the resource dependence theory of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), which posits that 
large boards can enhance firm performance through improvement in the quality of perspectives, delib-
erations and opinions, and access to more informed or better quality decisions (Belkhir, 2009; C. Dalton 
& D. Dalton, 2005).
The study further shows that directors are committed to sound governance practices when they have 
high stakes. Such practices support the profitable management of business entities. Finally, the study 
shows that banks with a robust asset base are likely to record enhanced financial performance. 
Based on the above findings, the study asserts that increased bank profitability significantly derives 
from good governance and, therefore, recommends maintaining adequate governance mechanisms to 
ensure that banks are profitably managed. For instance, the requirement for a substantial equity stake 
by directors of banking institutions should be sustained. By their unique nature, banks are highly lev-
ered institutions because of massive deposit liabilities in their portfolio. If banks are to run entirely on 
debt, the board’s commitment to monitoring top management may be compromised. Minimum paid-
up bank capital should be periodically reviewed to support the maintenance of optimum bank assets. 
Also, board size should be maintained at an optimal level to enhance performance.
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